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Abstract 
We combine spatial and monopolistic competition to study market interactions between downtown 
retailers and an outlying shopping mall. Consumers shop at either marketplace or at both, and buy each 
variety in volume. The market solution stems from the interplay between the market expansion effect 
generated by consumers seeking more opportunities, and the competition effect. Firms’ profits increase 
(decrease) with the entry of local competitors when the former (latter) dominates. Downtown retailers 
swiftly vanish when the mall is large. A predatory but efficient mall need not be regulated, whereas the 
regulator must restrict the size of a mall accommodating downtown retailers. 
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1 Introduction
In North Decatur, Georgia (United States), local residents have recently come out against the con-
struction of a Walmart supermarket. Common criticisms were that Walmart’s presence eliminates
more jobs than it creates; lowers a community’s quality of life by eroding local tax bases; and,
through aggressively low pricing, kills small or family-owned businesses. Such an attitude toward
large discount stores has a long history in the United States and may be encountered both in urban
and rural communities (Courser, 2005). But this is only one facet of the problem. Competition
between small downtown retailers and out-of-town shopping malls has important implications for
the residential structure of cities and the quality of urban life. In particular, constructing large
shopping malls in suburbia has exacerbated the extent of urban sprawl and contributed to the hol-
lowing out of city centers. According to Fogelson (2005), “the decentralization of the department
store is one of the main reasons that the central business district, once the mecca for shoppers,
does less than 5 percent of the retail trade of metropolitan areas everywhere but in New York,
New Orleans, and San Francisco.”
Those issues have been tackled mainly from the urban planning viewpoint, an approach that
typically disregards the competition and welfare aspects. In this paper, we aim to develop a
new framework that combines spatial competition (Hotelling, 1929) and monopolistic competition
(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). In our framework, the city has two shopping locations: one is downtown
(shopping street) and is composed of many retailers; the other is set up at the city outskirts
(shopping mall) and is run by a developer.1 Each downtown retailer is too small to affect the
market outcome and treats its competitors’ strategies as a given. In contrast, the mall developer
is a big player who manipulates the market. Consumers are exogenously dispersed between the
two marketplaces and bear specific travel costs to acquire the varieties available in each one.
Though consumers’ shopping behavior has several determinants (Teller, 2008), we focus on two
first-order forces affecting consumer attitudes: love for variety, and travelling costs. The former
expresses consumers’ desire to access a broad range of choices; the latter reflects the economic im-
portance of shopping costs in consumers’ budget. For example, American households spend almost
the same amount of their overall travel time to go to work and to go shopping, i.e., 23.6 percent
versus 21.8 percent (Couture et al., 2012). By combining spatial and monopolistic competition, we
are able to disentangle the various effects triggered by these two opposing forces. Although price
difference is a major determinant of consumer behavior, our initial setting assumes that prices are
the same in the two shopping places. This allows us to capture in a simple way a wide range of
interactions between these places. Furthermore, we show later that our approach displays enough
versatility to account for price differences as well as various types of asymmetries between the two
1The reasons why retailers are agglomerated at the city center are not addressed in this paper. However, it is
well known that, when travel costs are not too high, being clustered in a few places allows firms to benefit from
agglomeration economies that overshadow the market crowding effect (Wolinsky, 1983; Stahl, 1987; Fujita and
Thisse, 2013).
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marketplaces.
One-stop shopping is cheaper and thus more appealing to consumers than two-stop shopping.
However, since consumers love variety, shopping behavior depends not only on the travel costs but
also on the range of goods available in each shopping place. This has an important consequence:
unlike standard models of spatial competition, market areas overlap. The extent of overlapping
hinges on the number of firms located in each shopping place and the travel costs. Moreover, both
the individual consumption of a variety and the product range consumed also change with the
consumer’s shopping behavior. These are important considerations that have been neglected in
the industrial organization literature where every consumer typically buys one unit of a variety.
Our main findings may be summarized as follows. First, the market outcome stems from the
interplay between two opposing forces. The first, the market expansion effect, is generated by
consumers seeking more opportunities. As a result, the entry of competitors generates a network
effect that makes a shopping location more attractive.2 The second force amounts to a market
competition effect: consumption of a variety obtained from each shop decreases as the size of the
marketplace increases, and as the number of marketplaces visited by the consumer goes up. When
the network effect is sufficiently strong, we show that entry in a marketplace is profit-increasing.3
Equally important is the fact that consumers are attracted by marketplaces that are close by
because of travel costs. Combining the distance and network effects implies that consumers’
shopping behavior is driven by gravitational forces whose intensity increases with the size of a
marketplace and decreases as the distance grows between consumers and the marketplace.
As predicted by the North Decatur anti-Walmart activists, the number of downtown retailers
shrinks as the outlying shopping mall grows. Less expected, perhaps, is that the city commercial
center swiftly vanishes when the size of the out-of-town shopping mall is sufficiently large. This
result highlights the main forces at work in our setting and, therefore, deserves more explanation.
Establishing new stores at the city outskirts diverts consumers from visiting downtown retailers.
This in turn leads to a contraction of the central commercial district through the exit of retailers,
which makes this marketplace even less attractive. The overall effect is to further reduce the
number of customers, which cuts down the number of retailers once more. When the relative size
of the downtown shopping area is small enough, this keeps going on until no firm operates in the
city center.
Second, we confirm the well-documented fact that the disappearance of downtown retailers is
more likely to arise in small or poor cities. In a large or rich city, the mall developer must build
a large capacity to attract all customers. To be precise, the mall size needed to drive downtown
retailers out of business may be too big for a predatory strategy to be profitable. In this event, the
developer chooses to accommodate the presence of downtown retailers. This situation may also
2This is reminiscent of Chou and Shy (1990) who analyze endogenous network effects without network external-
ities, but the sources of such effects are very different.
3Note that Schulz and Stahl (1996) and Chen and Riordan (2008) obtain profit-increasing competition in differ-
ent, but related, models.
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arise because local governments adopt policies aimed at maintaining the city center’s attractiveness
through the supply of various types of urban amenities. On the contrary, large-scale economies in
logistics have allowed outlying shopping malls to become more attractive through lower prices.
Third, the question whether mall developers should be regulated or not is a priori unclear. Yet
speculation on this issue has never been in short supply, and this is one of the main questions that
local decision makers would like addressed. Our analysis suggests a qualified answer. Regulation is
needed when the mall developer is not efficient enough to capture the whole market: the regulator
always selects a smaller size for the mall than the size that would emerge under free competition.
In contrast, when the mall developer is very efficient, the regulator should not intervene: the
market outcome is socially optimal despite the disappearance of downtown retailers. However, we
also show that a majority of consumers are opposed to an outlying shopping mall, even when the
opening of such a mall is socially desirable. This provides a rationale for the widespread hostile
attitude of citizen groups and city councils toward big-box stores coming to town.
Last, we consider four extensions of the baseline model. In the first one, downtown retailers
and mall stores are heterogeneous, charge different prices, and offer different amenities to their
customers. We show how these asymmetries affect the behavior and size of the marketplaces.
In the second extension, we stress that a large and/or rich city is more likely to keep a lively
downtown than a small and/or poor city. In the third extension, we show that urban sprawl raises
the competitive advantage of out-of-town malls at the expense of downtown retailers. Our last
extension studies the impact of the mall location.
Related literature. In the literature on consumers’ search, it is typically assumed that
visiting a new shop generates the same given cost as any other one (McMillan and Rothschild
1994). Wolinsky (1983) is a noticeable exception in which search costs vary with the location of
shops. Schulz and Stahl (1996) consider a market for differentiated products in which imperfectly
informed agents engage in costly search for the best variety-price combination, while Armstrong
and Vickers (2010) allow for two-stop shopping. Unlike us, these various authors assume that
the volumes and product ranges consumed are independent of firms’ strategies and individual
shopping behavior. Moreover, they do not consider competition between marketplaces of different
size and different organizational structure. Smith and Hay (2005) study competition between two
spatially separate marketplaces but there are three major differences between their approach and
ours. First, their consumers are one-stop shoppers. Second, the individual demand for a variety is
perfectly inelastic. Third, their marketplaces have the same organizational structure. Our paper,
because it combines a large number of small businesses and one big developer, also contributes to
the recent literature that focuses on competition between “large” and “small” firms, namely firms
that differ in nature, not just in type (Shimomura and Thisse, 2012).
Finally, our model is related to the literature on vertical relations where a typical question is how
different types of contracts between upstream and downstream firms affect the market structure
and social welfare. We address a similar issue but our approach has features that distinguish it
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from the existing literature: the upstream firm (the mall developer) produces a scarce input (slots
for shops) and chooses both the number of downstream firms (the mall stores) that will get a slot
and its price. Since the slot price may be interpreted as a fixed cost of downstream firms, the mall
developer does not affect directly these firms’ price and outputs. However, as in Chemla (2003),
it does so indirectly through the number of operating downstream firms. It thus seems fair to say
that our model ties together different strands of literature.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2, focusing on a shopping
mall. However, we show that most of our analysis still holds for the more technically involved case
of a supermarket such as Walmart. In Section 3, we study how downtown retailers are affected
by the size of the shopping mall, and how mall stores are affected by the size of the downtown
shopping district. In Section 4, the market outcome is determined as the perfect Nash equilibrium
of a sequential game involving a mall developer, who chooses the number of slots he sells/rents to
stores; mall stores, which buy/rent a slot in the shopping mall; and a large number of retailers,
which locate in the city center. In Section 5, we investigate the welfare implications of regulating
shopping malls and provide a political economy analysis of big retailers’ entry. Section 6 studies
extensions of the baseline model, namely, cost and quality asymmetries between downtown retailers
and mall stores; the impact of city size and population density; and the location of the shopping
mall. Section 7 concludes. In particular, we show how our setting can be reinterpreted to describe
consumers having heterogeneous tastes for different shopping environments.
2 The Model and Preliminary Results
2.1 Consumers and sellers
Consider a one-dimensional city populated with a unit mass of consumers distributed with a
uniform density over [0, 1]. The cases of a variable city size and a non-uniform population density
are discussed in Section 6. Let x ∈ [0, 1] denote a consumer’s location and her distance to the
SST. The city has two marketplaces. The first one is a shopping street (SST) located in the central
business district at x = 0. The second one is a shopping mall (SM) located at x = 1. The SM is
located at the city limit because such a location allows offering the customers various facilities, e.g.
parking, which can hardly be provided at the city center where the price of land is much higher.
In what follows, the SST and the SM are referred to as shopping or marketplaces.
There are two goods, that is, a horizontally differentiated good and an outside good. The
differentiated good is supplied by a large number (formally, a continuum) of profit-maximizing
firms; each one is free to choose in which marketplace to locate its shop. We use the term retailers
to refer to the firms located in the SST, while those accommodated by the SM are called stores.
We refer to the SST and SM as the city’s shopping centers. Each firm supplies a single variety and
each variety is supplied by a single firm. Hence, varieties available in the two shopping places are
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differentiated. The outside good is supplied by perfectly competitive firms located at x = 0 and
x = 1; it is chosen as the numeraire.
Consumers. Consumers share the same CES preferences over the differentiated good, which
are nested in a quasi-linear utility:4
U ≡ 1
ρ
ln
(
I(SST )
 n
0
qρi di+ I(SM)
 N
0
Qρjdj
)
+ A (1)
where n (N) is the mass of varieties supplied in the SST (SM), qi (Qj) the consumption of the ith
variety (jth variety) variety available in the SST (SM), 0 < ρ < 1, and A the consumption of the
numeraire. The unit of the differentiated good is chosen for the coefficient of the logarithm to be
equal to 1/ρ. In (1), I(k) is the indicator function defined as follows:
I(k) ≡
1 when the consumer visits k ∈ {SST, SM}0 otherwise.
Because preferences are symmetric, the utility of consuming a variety available in the SST is the
same as the utility of a variety supplied in the SM. Given (1), it is readily verified that a consumer
buys a strictly positive amount of the differentiated good, for otherwise its utility equals −∞. As
a consequence, every consumer visits at least one shopping location. Since consumers have a love
for variety, they have an incentive to visit the two of them. However, travelling to a shopping
place requires is costly. In standard models of spatial competition, travel costs are proportional to
the distance covered and the quantities shipped. This approach is not suitable to study shopping
places because, once a consumer is in the STT or the SM, it does not have to pay additional costs
to visit all the sellers established therein. By implication, there are scope economies in shopping.
They are captured by assuming that consumers bear travel costs independent of the quantities of
goods they purchase, but linear in the distance to the shopping place. In other words, individual
outlays on transportation are lump-sum (Stahl, 1982, 1987). Let τ > 0 be the travel cost per unit
distance. Hence, a consumer residing at x faces the budget constraint:
I(SST )
( n
0
piqidi+ τx
)
+ I(SM)
( N
0
PjQjdj + τ(1− x)
)
+ A ≤ Y (2)
where pi (Pj) the price of the ith (jth) variety supplied in the SST (SM). We assume that the
income Y is sufficiently high for the consumption of the numeraire to be positive in equilibrium.
If a consumer visits the SST (SM) only, its inverse demand for a variety i (j) is given by
pi =
e0q
ρ−1
i
A0(q)
(
Pj =
e1Q
ρ−1
j
A1(Q)
)
(3)
4The partial equilibrium approach used here is more in the spirit of industrial organization. An urban economics
approach would favor a general equilibrium setting in which shopping expenditure equals income. At the expenses
of a more technical analysis, our setting can be modified to account for income effects.
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whereas its respective inverse demands are given by
pi =
(e0 + e1)qρ−1i
A(q,Q) Pj =
(e0 + e1)Qρ−1j
A(q,Q) (4)
when it visits both marketplaces.
In these expressions, A0(q), A1(Q) and A(q,Q) are market aggregates given by
A0(q) ≡
 n
0
qρkdk
(
A1(Q) ≡
 N
0
Qρl dl
)
A(q,Q) ≡
 n
0
qρkdk +
 N
0
Qρl dl
while e0 (e1) is the consumer’s expenditure in the SST (SM). It follows from (1) and (2) that e0 = 1
and e1 = 0 if the consumer patronizes the SST only; e0 = 0 and e1 = 1 if it visits the SM only;
and e0 + e1 = 1 if it goes to both places. Thus, regardless of its shopping behavior, the consumer
spends one unit of the numeraire on the differentiated good, but the values of e0 and e1 depend
on the consumer’s shopping behavior.
Sellers. Up to Section 6, we assume that both retailers and stores share the same marginal
production cost c. Because a seller is negligible to the market, its own price choice has no impact on
the market aggregates A0, A1 and A in (3) and (4). For the same reason, a seller’s price choice also
has no impact either on the number of customers visiting the shopping place in which the seller is
set up. Therefore, each seller faces an isoelastic demand, which implies that the profit-maximizing
prices are the same across all varieties and given by
p∗ = P ∗ = c
ρ
. (5)
Consequently, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), profit-maximizing prices are unaffected by the
number of competitors and market size. Admittedly, these properties are very restrictive. Our line
of defence involves the following arguments. First, our model can easily be extended to cope with
discount retailing. For example, if stores are more efficient than retailers, i.e. c1 < c0, varieties are
cheaper in the SM than in the SST but the price ratio p∗/P ∗ > 1 remains independent of n and
N . Everything else being equal, this makes the SM relatively more attractive than the SST. We
return to this issue in Section 6.1. Second, as argued in the concluding section, most of our results
remain valid for a wider class of preferences that accounts for price competition between sellers.
We have chosen to work with the CES because it allows us to obtain simple closed-form solutions
as well as to disentangle size and distance effects from price effects.
Third, the out-of-town shopping place is established by a profit-maximizing developer who runs
a shopping mall - the developer choosing the number of independent shops that will be included in
the mall and a renting price. Alternatively, the developer could run a supermarket, which means
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that the developer selects the number of stores and also the price at which they sell their product.5
Thus, a supermarket may be viewed as a vertically integrated firm, whereas a shopping mall can be
described by a vertical relationship involving one upstream producer and a myriad of downstream
shop-keepers. If the developer operates a supermarket, the symmetry of preferences implies that
all varieties are sold at the same profit-maximizing price P¯ . Therefore, we can redo the same
analysis by replacing P ∗ with P¯ . How the supermarket chooses P¯ is immaterial for our purpose.
Last, in Section 6.1, we show that consumers may have a preference for one type of marketplace
over the other.
Although we assume that retailers act noncooperatively, we recognize that small-business as-
sociations aim to exchange their political influence for governmental policies that compensate for
their weakness in the marketplace. In the same vein, coalitions of local merchants and community
leaders work to improve local public spaces, which takes the concrete form of urban amenities and
pedestrian areas. These issues are discussed in the extensions of our baseline model.
2.2 Shopping behavior
Consumer shopping behavior is driven by utility maximization. Since both retailers and stores
charge the same price while the degree of product differentiation is the same in the two shopping
areas, the number of consumers drawn by a marketplace hinges only upon the mass of varieties
it supplies relatively to the mass of varieties provided by the other shopping place. However, as
will be shown below, the individual utility level varies with the number of varieties supplied in
each shopping place, n and N , as well as with the total number of varieties, n + N . To simplify
notation, we choose the unit of the numeraire for c/ρ to be equal to 1.
Three shopping patterns may arise.
(i) I(SST ) = I(SM) = 1. The consumer shops at both marketplaces. Using (4) and (5), it is
readily verified that such a consumer buys the same quantity of each of the n+N varieties:
q = Q = 1
n+N . (6)
Plugging (6) into (1), we obtain the indirect utility of a consumer visiting the two shopping
places:
V = ln (n+N)
σ − 1 − τ + (I − 1) (7)
where σ ≡ 1/(1− ρ) is the elasticity of substitution across varieties. Note that (7) is independent
of the consumer location x because τx+ τ(1− x) = τ .
(ii) I(SST ) = 1 and I(SM) = 0. in this event, the consumer prefers a one-stop shopping at
5In this case, the pricing rule (5) still holds for the retailers, but not for the stores because the developer
internalizes the cannibalization effect generated by the sale of substitutes.
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the SST. It follows from (3) and (5) that its demand for a variety is
q = 1
n
(8)
while its indirect utility level is equal to
V0(x) =
lnn
σ − 1 − τx+ (I − 1) (9)
which decreases with x.
(iii) I(SST ) = 0 and I(SM) = 1. When the consumer prefers shopping at the SM only, its
demand is given by
Q = 1
N
. (10)
Such a consumer enjoys an indirect utility level given by
V1(x) =
lnN
σ − 1 − τ(1− x) + (I − 1) (11)
which increases with x. Although the developer does not provide directly varieties, it faces the
issue of cannibalization that characterizes multi-product firms: the larger the number of stores in
the SM, the smaller the quantity sold by each store.
Observe that, regardless of the consumer’s shopping behavior, its utility level increases at a
decreasing rate with the number of varieties available in the center(s) it chooses to visit. Figure 1
depicts the utility level reached by consumers according to their location. Consumers located near
the middle of the segment are worse-off than those located close to the shopping places because they
bear higher travel costs. They partially compensate their locational disadvantage by consuming
the entire range of varieties.
9
Figure 1. Utilities and shopping behavior
Throughout the paper, we will use the following notation. Let ν ≡ N/n be the relative size of
the SM with respect to the SST and
T ≡ exp[(σ − 1)τ ] > 1.
A high (low) value of T means that travel costs are high (low) or varieties are good (poor)
substitutes. The parameter T thus captures the travel and product differentiation effects, which
are critical in our approach to shopping behavior. Both marketplaces become more attractive
when either of these parameters decreases. For a given value of τ , more differentiated varieties
make both the SST and SM more attractive, while for a given σ, lowering travel costs makes it
easier to visit both marketplaces.
The solution to V0(x) = V1(x) is given by
x¯ = 12
(
1− ln νlnT
)
so that more consumers visit the SST than the SM if the size of the former exceeds that of the
latter. This expression shows that, for a given T , the two marketplaces cannot be too dissimilar
in size, for otherwise all consumers would patronize the bigger marketplace only.
Our approach to shopping behavior implies the existence of three groups of consumers.
(i) A consumer located at x visits both the SST and the SM if it has a higher utility when it
patronizes both places rather than a single one:
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V ≥ max {V0(x), V1(x)} (12)
which is equivalent to x¯0 ≤ x ≤ x¯1 where
x¯0 = max
{
0, 1− ln(1 + ν)lnT
}
(13)
x¯1 = min
{
1, ln (1 + 1/ν)lnT
}
(14)
the second term in (13) and (14) being the solution to, respectively, V = V0(x) and V = V1(x).
For a positive mass of consumers to be two-stop shoppers, it must be that V > V0(x¯) = V1(x¯).
(ii) A consumer at x prefers shopping at the SST if
V0(x) > max {V, V1(x)}
which is equivalent to 0 ≤ x < min {x¯0, x¯}. This interval is nonempty if and only if the consumer
at x = 0 shops at the SST only, which amounts to
ν < T − 1.
In other words, the size advantage of the SM is not sufficiently large for the consumers located
near the SST to bear the additional travel costs to visit the SM. In this case, the consumer
indifferent between patronizing the sole SST or both shopping places, is located at x = min {x¯0, x¯}.
(iii) Similarly, a consumer at x patronizes only the SM if
V1(x) > max {V, V0(x)}
which is equivalent to max {x¯1, x¯} < x ≤ 1. This interval is nonempty if and only if the consumer
at x = 1 shops at the SM only, which amounts to
ν >
1
T − 1 .
For our purpose, the most interesting market configuration involves the existence of the three
groups of consumers, which requires 0 < x¯0 < x¯ < x¯1 < 1. For two-stop shopping to arise, (12)
must hold at x¯, which is not satisfied in general when T > 4. We also rule out the case in which
all consumers visit the two marketplaces, i.e. x¯0 = 0 and x¯1 = 1. Using (13) and (14), it is readily
verified that these two equalities never hold simultaneously when T > 2. Therefore, in what follows
we focus on the special, but relevant, case in which 2 < T < 4. We will discuss in the concluding
section what our main results become when T ≤ 2 and T ≥ 4.
One of the main distinctive features of our model then lies in the existence of a contention
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area [x¯0, x¯1] formed by the two-stop shoppers (see Figure 1 for an illustration). This area widens
(shrinks) as T decreases (increases) because both marketplaces become more (less) attractive.
Consumers living in the contention area split their expenditure between the SST and the SM
according to the wallet shares 1/(1 + ν) and ν/(1 + ν). When ν rises, the SST (SM) has fewer
(more) customers because both x¯0 and x¯1 move to the left (right), and thus fewer (more) consumers
shop downtown. In addition, consumers located in the contention area spend less (more) in the
SST (SM). Thus, unlike standard models of spatial competition, we have two - instead of one -
marginal consumers and a wallet share effect that varies with the relative size of the SST and SM.
For any given n and N , it follows immediately from (5), (6), (8), and (10) that the operating
profits of a retailer are given by
piR(n, N) = (1− ρ)
(
x¯0
n
+ x¯1 − x¯0
n+N
)
(15)
whereas those made by a store are such that
piS(n,N) = (1− ρ)
(
x¯1
N
+ x¯1 − x¯0
n+N
)
. (16)
Therefore, the profit functions are symmetric:
piS(n, N) = piR(N, n). (17)
3 Competition between Shopping Centers
In this section, we study how competition between the two shopping places is affected by an
exogenous change in the size of one marketplace, here the shopping mall. The equilibrium markup
being constant, for any given n, the operating profits of a store are proportional to its demand.
Since x¯0 and x¯1 are homogeneous of degree 0 in (n, N), this can be achieved by working with
ν = N/n only. Alternatively, (17) implies that the same analysis can be done in terms of µ ≡
1/ν = n/N to study the impact of a change in the STT size.
Consider a fixed number n of retailers and an SM whose relative size is ν. It is then readily
verified that total expenditures in the SM increase with ν. However, this does not imply that the
quantity sold by each store also rises with ν because more firms compete within the SM.
A store demand is given by
DS(ν) =
1
n
(1− x¯1
ν
+ x¯1 − x¯01 + ν
)
. (18)
The number n of retailers being exogenous, (18) implies that a store demand depends only
upon the SM’s relative size. To see how DS varies with ν, consider a marginal increase dν in the
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mass of stores:
n dDS = −
(
1− x¯1
ν2
+ x¯1 − x¯0(1 + ν)2
)
dν − 11 + ν dx¯0 −
(1
ν
− 11 + ν
)
dx¯1. (19)
The first term of this expression stands for the “competition effect” within the SM when the
market boundaries x¯0 and x¯1 are unchanged. This term, which stems from the deeper fragmentation
of demand associated with a larger number of local varieties, is always negative. The second and
third terms of (19) represent the “market expansion effect” generated by a bigger SM. When
more varieties are offered in the SM, some consumers located close to the SST choose to visit
both marketplaces instead of shopping at the SST only (x¯0 decreases), whereas more consumers
established in the vicinity of the SM now choose to visit the sole SM (x¯1 decreases). To be precise,
using (13) and (14), it is easy to see that dx¯0 and dx¯1 are both negative. As a result, the second
and third terms of (19) are always positive.
Which effect dominates depends on the relative size of the two shopping areas as well as on
the value of T . This interaction distinguishes our model from the existing literature in which
individual demands are perfectly inelastic (Schulz and Stahl, 1996; Gehrig, 1998; Smith and Hay,
2005). Here increasing the number of firms in a shopping center affects a seller’s demand through
the number of customers and their individual consumption.
Three cases may arise according to the value of ν.
1. Consider the case where the SM is small, and thus 0 < x¯0 < x¯1 = 1. The demand faced by
a store is given by
DS(ν) =
1
n
1− x¯0
1 + ν .
Differentiating this expression with respect to ν and using (13), we obtain
n
dDS
dν
= 1− ln(1 + ν)
(1 + ν)2 lnT
> 0
because ν < 1/(T − 1) < 1. In this case, the market expansion effect dominates the competition
effect. This is because the boundary x¯0 is very sensitive to an increase in ν, which makes the market
expansion effect stronger, whereas there are only a small number of consumers visiting the SM,
and thus the competition effect is weak. Hence, when the SM is small, the market expansion effect
is sufficiently strong to shift upwards the demand for the varieties supplied by the incumbents. As
a consequence, these stores earn higher profits when they face more competition within the SM.
In other words, there is profit-increasing competition.
2. We now come to the configuration 0 < x¯0 < x¯1 < 1, which arises when the SM is larger but
not too large. Two subcases may arise. In the first one, we have T ≤ 2.39. We show in Appendix 1
that the market expansion effect still dominates the competition effect for all 1/(T−1) < ν < T−1.
The intuition behind this result is that under a high degree of product differentiation and/or low
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travel costs, both the boundaries x¯0 and x¯1 are very sensitive to an increase in ν, thus generating
a strong market expansion effect.
In the second subcase, T exceeds 2.39. In other words, varieties are less differentiated and/or
travel costs are higher. We show in Appendix 1 that there exists a threshold ν¯ ∈ [1/(T − 1), T − 1]
such that the market expansion effect keeps dominating the competition effect provided that ν < ν¯.
Otherwise, raising the number of stores makes the incumbents worse off. Indeed, the range of
varieties provided by the SM being larger, the marginal utility of new varieties is lower. We fall
back here on the standard result of profit-decreasing competition.
3. It remains to consider the case in which the SM is very large. Since x¯0 = 0 < x¯1 < 1, the
demand faced by a store located in the SM is now given by
DS(ν) =
1
n
(1− x¯1
ν
+ x¯11 + ν
)
. (20)
Again, two subcases may arise according to the value of T . First, when T ≤ 2.06, νˆ > T − 1
exists such that the market expansion effect dominates the competition effect for all values of
ν ∈]T − 1, νˆ[. Second, when T > 2.06, the competition effects becomes stronger than the market
expansion effect for all ν > T − 1 (see Appendix 1).
The next proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 1. Assume that n is fixed. Then, if the shopping mall is not too big relatively
to the number of retailers established at the SST, a store’s profit increases with the number of
competitors. In contrast, the profits earned by a store decrease with N when the shopping mall is
big enough.
In other words, a store’s profit function piS(n, N) is unimodal in N . In contrast, raising the
number of stores in the SM decreases total expenditure in the SST, thus implying that adding
stores to the SM is always detrimental to the retailers. Therefore, a retailer’s profit function
piR(n,N) decreases with N . It follows from (17) that piR(n,N) is unimodal in n while piS(n,N)
decreases with n when N is fixed.
The standard thought experiment of spatial competition theory is to study the impact of better
transportation facilities on the market outcome. Because of symmetry, we restrict ourselves to the
case in which the SST is smaller than the SM (n < N). When n < N/(T − 1), the SST attracts
more customers purchasing the whole array of varieties, while the SM retains the same number of
customers. As a consequence, retailers benefit from lower travel costs. The pattern changes when
n exceeds N/(T −1). Owing to the better accessibility from everywhere in the city, both shopping
places gain customers. However, because n < N , those who patronized the SST but now shop
in both places spend more in the SM than in the SST. In contrast, those who used to buy from
the SM only keep spending more in the SM. Appendix 2 shows that, in this event, lower travel
costs make the retailers worse off. Therefore, unlike standard models of spatial competition with
one-stop shopping, the relationship between retailers’ profits and travel costs is non-monotonic.
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The above analysis has highlighted the market effects at work in the process of competition
between spatially separated shopping places. Working with exogenous numbers of retailers and
stores can be justified on the ground that the sizes of the SST and SM may be determined through
different institutional mechanisms. For example, local policies may restrict retailing by allocating
land to offices, housing, and transport facilities, whereas laws or antitrust authorities may impose
limits on the size of shopping malls.
4 The Size of Shopping Centers
In this section, we determine the equilibrium size of the shopping places, which have different
organizational forms. The turnover of small retailers being high, free entry and exit prevails in the
SST. In contrast, the SM is built by a profit-maximizing developer who charges a fee to the stores
that settle therein. Thus, the developer internalizes the benefits associated with size, whereas
retailers maximize their own profits while neglecting the importance to act on an aggregate level.
Independent profit-maximizing stores are free to enter by paying a per slot price to the de-
veloper. Because each store is small (precisely, of measure zero), it is natural to assume that the
developer has the whole bargaining power over the per slot price, and thus chooses φ to maximizes
its profits given by
Π ≡ φN −B(ND) (21)
where B(ND) denotes the developer’s cost of building an SM of size ND, while N is the number
of stores choosing to set up in the SM and pay the fee φ. Though admittedly simple, this type
of contract is sufficient for us to show our main results. To be sure, more sophisticated contracts
between the developer and stores, which would allow the developer to act as a supermarket, could
be considered. However, investigating such issues would take us far from the main objective of this
paper.
It is historically well documented that downtown retailers have been active long before the
appearance of suburban malls (Cohen, 1996; Fogelson, 2005). Thus, we assume that, prior to the
entry of a developer, the SST hosts ne ≡ (1−ρ)/f retailers, that is, the number of firms prevailing
under free entry in the absence of a shopping mall. The ensuing market process is then described
by the following three-stage game. The developer, stores and retailers are involved in a strategic
environment involving one “large” player and a continuum of “small” players. The timing of the
game is as follows. In the first stage, the developer chooses the size ND of the SM and the per
slot price φ he charges to the stores that set up in the SM. When ND = 0, the developer does
not enter. In the second stage, out of a large number of potential firms (formally, a continuum),
some decide to buy/rent a slot in the SM when ND > 0, some others choose to stay in the SST,
whereas the remaining firms are out of business. Last, in the third stage, given the SST and SM
sizes, retailers and stores compete in price.
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Several reasons justify this staging. First, the developer necessarily commits to a certain size
when it builds an SM. Second, the actual number of stores in the SM depends on how much they
have to pay for a slot. Third, the developer understands that the decisions ND and φ are closely
linked. For example, building a small capacity and charging a low fee are inconsistent because the
SM cannot accommodate the large number of stores attracted by a low fee. As a result, we find it
reasonable to assume that the developer chooses ND and φ simultaneously at the first stage. Last,
retailers and stores move together because they display a similar flexibility in their investment and
price decisions. Their payoffs are given respectively by (15) and (16). Since Hotelling (1929), the
sequence between the location and price stages is standard in spatial competition models.
We seek a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and solve the game by backward induction. We
have seen that the equilibrium prices chosen in the third stage are given by (5). In what follows,
we describe the equilibrium outcome of the first and second stages.
4.1 The size of the SST under free entry
Retailers bear an exogenous entry cost f , which may be a fixed production cost or a lump-sum tax
to be paid to the city government to set up in the SST. For any given N , a free-entry equilibrium
n∗(N) arises when the zero-profit condition
piR(n,N) = f (22)
holds. Assume that ND is large enough for stores to enter the SM until their operating profits
equal the per slot price φ. Under these circumstances, the number N∗(n) of stores in the SM
satisfies the zero-profit condition
piS(n,N) = φ. (23)
In other words, the number of stores is determined as if firms were to operate under monopolistic
competition while facing the fixed cost φ set by the developer. The functions piR(n,N) and piS(n,N)
being homogeneous of degree −1, piR(µ, 1) and piS(1, ν) are homogeneous of degree 0. Since the
functions piS(1, ·) and piR(·, 1) are identical, N∗(n) is the mirror image of n∗(N). An equilibrium
of a second-stage subgame is thus an intersection point of the two curves n∗(N) and N∗(n).
Because of the presence of network effects, there exist several free-entry equilibria. First, as
shown by Figure 2, there are two equilibria such that n∗(N) is strictly positive. However, the
zero-profit condition admits solutions that are unstable to small perturbations: the entry (exit) of
an arbitrarily small mass of retailers may trigger a profit hike (drop), hence the entry (exit) of new
(existing) retailers. In such a context, it is conventional to refine the set of equilibria by requiring
stability. A free-entry equilibrium is stable if the entry of additional sellers reduces profits below
zero:
∂piR
∂n
(n∗, N) < 0.
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How does the equilibrium number of retailers n∗(N) vary with the size of the shopping mall?
Clearly, we have
∂piR
∂N
+ ∂piR
∂n
dn∗
dN
= 0.
The first term of this expression is negative because total expenditure in the SST always
decreases with N (see Section 3). Therefore, dn∗/dN < 0 (> 0) if and only if n∗(N) is a stable
(unstable) equilibrium. In other words, the equilibrium number of retailers decreases (increases)
with the size of the shopping mall when the free-entry equilibrium is stable (unstable).6
Using (13) and (14), it is readily verified that no consumer patronizes the SST when N is
arbitrarily large. Furthermore, we know that piS(1, ν) is unimodal in ν. Therefore, the set of
free-entry equilibria may be described as follows.
Proposition 2. There is a positive threshold N¯ such that (i) if N < N¯ , there exist two free-
entry equilibria, n∗ > n∗∗, where the former is stable and the latter unstable and (ii) if N ≥ N¯ ,
the SST involves no retailers.
Note that, whenever N > 0, n∗ = 0 is also a stable free-entry equilibrium because the SST
is too small for the operating profits made by a few sellers to cover their entry cost. Thus, for
N < N¯ , there exist three equilibria, two are stable and one is unstable, a configuration which is
typical of models with network effects. The pattern of free-entry equilibria as a function of N is
described in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Free entry equilibria
Two more comments are in order. First, when its size is large (N ≥ N¯), the SM is sufficiently
attractive to hollow out the city center. In other words, the SM is so big that the marginal utility
of the additional varieties that the retailers could supply is lower that the travel costs consumers,
6The existence of the unstable free entry equilibrium is an artefact stemming from the assumption of a continuum
of retailers. If a retailer were of a very small but positive size , the unstable equilibrium would cease to be a Nash
equilibrium of the entry game. In this case, an increase in the mass of active firms by  would render profits positive,
and thus non-entrant retailers would find it profitable to enter.
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even those located in the vicinity of the city center, must bear to go to the SST. By analogy with
the concept of limit price, we refer to N¯ as the limit size of the shopping mall. As a result, when
N < N¯ , the SM never attracts the whole city population and the SST survives as a marketplace.
In other words, for all consumers to visit the SM, it must be that all downtown retailers are out
of business.
Second, an SM having the limit size triggers the complete and sudden disappearance of the
SST. For N < N¯ , Proposition 2 implies that n∗(N) decreases with N . However, n∗(N) does not
decrease smoothly to 0. Indeed, n∗(N) experiences a downward jump to n∗(N¯) = 0. The intuition
behind this result is as follows. When N = N¯ , the remaining retailers make negative profits, and
thus some of them must exit the market. This in turn makes the SST less attractive to consumers
so that fewer of them visit the SST. This unravelling process keeps going on until no retailers are
in business. For such a process to be sustainable, the relative size of the SST must be sufficiently
small, which explains why it occurs when the SM is sufficiently large.
Since N∗(n) and n∗(N) are mirror images, Proposition 2 can be restated in terms of n and
µ = 1/ν, that is, n¯ > 0 exists such that there is no SM if the size of the SST exceeds n¯. As a
result, for downtown retailers and a shopping mall to coexist within the same city, one shopping
place cannot be much larger than the other.
4.2 Competition between stores and retailers
We now determine the equilibrium outcome (n∗, N∗) of the second-stage subgame generated by
(ND, φ). Because characterizing the equilibria for all subgames is long and tedious, we find it
convenient to prove an intermediate result that rules out a priori some pairs (n,N).
Claim 1. At any perfect Nash equilibrium such that ND > 0, there is no idle capacity.
Furthermore, the equilibrium per slot price is equal to piS(n∗, N∗).
(i) Assume that ND > N∗. Then, by slightly reducing ND, the developer saves on building
costs without reducing his revenue. Indeed, N∗ solves the equation piS(n∗, N) = φ, which is
independent of ND. (ii) If φ < piS(n∗, N∗) and N∗ = ND, the developer could increase his profit
by charging a higher fee because stores earn positive profits. If φ > piS(n∗, N∗), stores would make
negative profits.
We have seen that, for any N < N¯ , there exist three free-entry equilibria. We follow the
literature and disregard the unstable outcome. Thus, we end up with two stable equilibria. Are
they equally likely? As said above, downtown retailers were active long before the appearance of
suburban malls. Therefore, it seems natural to expect the SST to shrink from ne until it gets into
the basin of attraction of the second stable equilibrium n∗ = N/ν∗ < ne where the melting of the
SST would stop. In other words, the stable equilibrium n∗ = N/ν∗ is more likely to emerge than
n∗ = 0 as a free-entry equilibrium. Thus, we find this equilibrium implausible and exclude it.
Alternatively, we can appeal to the concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium to justify this
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choice. Because a retailer making zero-profits prefers to be in than out of business, the only
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is the stable free-entry equilibrium involving n∗ > 0 sellers. In-
deed, the incumbent retailers are not willing to exit the market as long as they make zero profits,
whereas the entry of a positive mass of retailers would result in negative profits. The other two
equilibria are not coalition-proof because a positive mass of retailers such that the size of the SST
is n∗ would choose to enter the SST. Nevertheless, we recognize that a big shock can trigger the
sudden disappearance of the SST in a small city (n jumps down from ne to n∗ = 0).
Based on this argument and Claim 1, we find it legitimate to restrict the analysis to equilib-
ria (n∗, N∗) of the second-stage subgame such that (i) N∗ = ND, (ii) piS(n∗, N∗) = φ, (iii) if
N∗ < N¯ , then n∗ > 0. Such equilibria are called plausible. In the next claim, we provide a full
characterization of plausible equilibria.
Claim 2. Assume that ND > 0 and piS(n∗(ND), ND) = φ. Then,
(
n∗(ND), ND
)
is a plau-
sible equilibrium. Furthermore, it is unique. If ND < N¯ , then both shopping places are active.
Otherwise, only the SM is active.
(i) Retailers have no incentives to entry/exit for n∗(ND) is a stable free-entry equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, the capacity of the SM prevents further entry in the SM, while stores have no incentives
to exit since their profits are non-negative. Thus,
(
n∗(ND), ND
)
is a plausible equilibrium. Since
ND is given, uniqueness follows from the fact that n∗(·) is a single-valued mapping. (ii) We know
from Proposition 2 that n∗(ND) > 0 if and only if ND < N¯ .
Among other things, Claim 2 allows describing the emergence of the plausible equilibrium
through an auction undertaken by the developer. A large number of stores compete by bidding to
get a slot from the range supplied by the developer. In this auction, each store understands that
the highest bid it can offer depends on the number of stores that will get a slot as well as on the
number of retailers that will locate in the SST. This makes the auction much more complex than
in standard models because the individual surplus depends on the decisions made by the other
players. In other words, to find its maximum bid each store must guess what the equilibrium values
of N and n will be. Such settings are typically plagued with the existence of multiple equilibria.
Because the plausible equilibrium is unique, the auction ends up here with a single number of
stores, which is equal to N∗(n∗).
4.3 The size of the shopping mall
It remains to determine the equilibrium size and fee chosen by the developer at the first stage
of the game. The value of N stems from the collective decisions made by stores in the second
stage of the game. It then follows from Claim 2 that the developer always chooses ND = N and
φ = piS(n∗(N), N). As a result, his profit function (21) may be rewritten as follows:
Π(n∗(N), N) = NpiS(n∗(N), N)−B(N). (24)
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For N < N¯, the function n∗(N) is defined implicitly by the free-entry and stability conditions
in the STT:
piR(n,N) = f
∂piR
∂n
≤ 0
whereas we have n∗(N) = 0 for N ≥ N¯ . Since n∗(N) exhibits a downward jump at N = N¯
where n∗ = 0, the developer’s profit function has an upward jump at N = N¯ . Indeed, because
stores’ profits decrease with the number of SST retailers, we have piS(n∗(N), N¯) < piS(0, N¯), which
would allow the developer to increase the per slot price φ by an increment ∆φ > 0 when N = N¯ .
Furthermore, the developer never chooses a size exceeding N¯ because his profits are equal to
Π = 1− ρ−B(N)
which always decreases with N .
Because the function Π(n∗(N), N) is bounded above on ]0, N¯ [, the developer’s maximum profit
is given by
Π∗ = max
0, sup
N∈]0,N¯ [
Π, (1− ρ)−B(N¯)
 .
If Π∗ = 0, the developer does not launch an SM and consumers will shop at the SST only.
If Π∗ = sup Π > 0, the developer opens a shopping mall and accommodates retailers located in
the central business district. Finally, if Π∗ = (1− ρ)− B(N¯), the developer chooses to launch an
SM having the limit size N¯ , and thus triggers the exit of all retailers. Hence, a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of our three-stage game always exists. When the equilibrium size N∗ of the SM
is smaller than its limit size, we say that the developer accommodates the presence of retailers;
otherwise, the market involves a predatory developer.
In what follows, we assume that the building cost is given by
B(N) ≡ F +
mN if 0 < N < N
E
M(N −NE) +mNE if NE ≤ N .
(25)
where F , m, M , and NE are positive parameters such that m < M and F < (M −m)NE. The
latter inequality implies that (25) displays increasing (decreasing) returns for N smaller (larger)
than NE. It is readily verified that F < (M − m)NE implies that the efficient size of the SM,
which minimizes the average building cost, is equal to NE. When F > (M −m)NE, the efficient
size of the SM is arbitrarily large.
The developer’s revenue is equal to NpiS(n∗(N), N) = piS(µ∗(N), 1). Since piS(µ, 1) decreases
with µ and µ∗(N) decreases with N , the revenue function always increases over [0, N¯ ]. As a result,
the developer always chooses its limit size when NE > N¯ and secures the whole market. If NE ≤ N¯
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and M is sufficiently large, the developer chooses his efficient size and accommodates the presence
of retailers. By changing the value of M , the profit-maximizing size of the SM can increase from
0 to the limit size N¯ , whereas the equilibrium size of the SST shrinks from ne to 0. Note also that
the fixed cost F cannot be very large for the developer to enter.
5 Should the Size of the Shopping Mall Be Regulated?
Several countries have passed laws restricting the size or entry of big-boxes because the presence of
small businesses would allow consumers to benefit from a wider array of varieties and services. It is,
therefore, worth studying how the total number of varieties available in the city, N ≡ N + n∗(N),
varies with the size N of the SM. Since the free-entry equilibrium n∗(N) decreases with N , it
is a priori unclear whether N increases or decreases with N . Yet, it turns out to be possible to
characterize the behavior of N in a precise way. The argument goes as follows.
The function piR(n;N) being homogenous of degree −1, the zero-profit condition piR(n; N) = f
can be rewritten as follows:
pi(µ) ≡ piR(µ, 1) = fN (26)
where µ = n/N . Since piR(n,N) = piR(µ, 1)/N , Proposition 1 implies that the function piR(µ; 1) is
unimodal in µ. Multiplying both sides of (26) by 1 + µ, we obtain:
1 + µ
f
pi(µ) = N + n∗(N). (27)
We show in Appendix 3 that this expression is unimodal in µ with a unique maximizer at
µ0 > 0. Hence, N increases (decreases) with N if and only if (27) is decreasing (increasing) at
µ∗(N). Since µ∗(N) decreases with N , N increases with N if and only if N ≤ N0 ≡ pi(µ0)/f .
The following proposition is a summary.
Proposition 3. The total number of varieties available in the city, first, increases and, then,
decreases with the size of the SM.
Thus, the mass of varieties reaches its maximum when the city accommodates both an SST
and an SM. In other words, the entry of an SM need not be detrimental to product diversity: the
city involves more varieties as long as the size of the SM is not large enough for N to be smaller
than ne. This suggest that the presence of an SM could well be beneficial to consumers.
Such an argument is incomplete, however, because it overlooks the fact that consumers must
bear specific travel costs to visit the shopping places. Owing to the exit of downtown retailers, the
consumers in [0, x¯0] have access to a narrower array of varieties. The consumers residing in [x¯0, y],
where y ≥ x¯0 is the solution to
(1− ρ) lnne − τy = (1− ρ) lnN − τ(1− y) (28)
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now consume the whole range of varieties but they bear a higher travel cost. Only the consumers
located in the interval [y, 1], if any, are better off when an SM of size N is launched. Therefore,
when N is sufficiently small, it follows from (28) that y is close or equal to 1, and thus the majority
of consumers is worse off when the SM is launched.
Does this explain why citizen groups and/or local governments often object to the entry of a
big-box in their area? For the majority of consumers to agree with the launching of an SM, it
must be that the consumer located at x = 1/2 is better off after entry. Therefore, the following
condition must hold:
(1− ρ) lnN(N)− τ ≥ (1− ρ) lnne − τ/2
which amounts to
N(N) ≥
√
Tne. (29)
Figure 3, which depicts the plot of the maximum product range as a function of T , shows
that this inequality never holds. Thus, regardless of the value of N smaller than the limit size, a
majority of consumers vote against the entry of an SM. That a majority of consumers is against
the entry of the SM when N is maximized may come as a surprise since N(N0) exceeds ne. This
is because the additional travel cost the consumer at x = 1/2 must bear to consume the varieties
supplied by the SM is not compensated by the variety increase. Of course, this result depends
on the lower bound T > 2. When T takes on sufficiently low values, (29) will be satisfied and
the launching of an SM at the city outskirts will get the support of a majority of consumers. In
other words, people’s attitude toward the entry of a shopping mall influenced by the quality of the
transportation system.
Figure 3. Maximum product range as a function of T
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This political economy argument could explain why in several countries or jurisdictions the size
of shopping malls is regulated by public authorities. Is this decision justified on efficiency grounds?
To answer this question,we consider a welfare-maximizing regulator who chooses the size N of the
SM that prevents the central business district to become a ghost town. In contrast, the number
of retailers is unregulated and determined by free entry and exit.
Since preferences are quasi-linear, the social welfare function is defined as total consumer surplus
plus firms’ profits:
W =
 1
0
V (x)dx+ n [piR(n,N)− f ] +N [piS(n,N)− φ] + Π(N). (30)
The regulator seeks the SM size that maximizes (30) subject to n = n∗(N) and N < N¯ . The
former constraint is the free-entry condition at the SST. The latter means that the city center
must remain a shopping place whose size is endogenously determined by entry and exit.
Using (7) – (11), (30) can be rewritten as follows (up to a constant):
W =
[
(1− ρ) ln (N + n∗(N)) + τ2
(
x¯20 + (1− x¯1)2
)]
+ [NpiS (n∗(N), N)−B(N)] (31)
where x¯0 and x¯1 are the marginal consumers’ locations given by (13) – (14).
It is straightforward to show that the first term in (31) decreases with N for all N < N¯ , whereas
the second is given by (24). Since the equilibrium size N∗ maximizes the developer’s profits under
n∗(N), we get the following result.
Proposition 4. Let N∗and N o be the size of the SM at the market equilibrium and social
optimum, respectively. Then, we have N o ≤ N∗. Furthermore, when 0 < N∗ < N¯ , a welfare-
maximizing regulator always chooses N o < N∗.
Therefore, the regulator chooses a size for the SM smaller than the size that would emerge under
unleashed competition. In other words, when the market outcome involves an accommodating
developer, regulating the size of the SM is welfare-enhancing. However, banning the entry of an
SM is generally not optimal.
Should a predatory developer be regulated too? The answer depends on the developer’s effi-
ciency. To illustrate, consider the building cost function (25) and set m = 0.1 and NE = 0.3 as
well as σ = 2, τ = 0.564 and f = 0.5. Numerical calculations show that the developer adopts
a predatory behavior if and only if the marginal cost of an additional store M is not too high
(M ≤ 4.71), while it is optimal to regulate the size of the SM when M is not too low (M ≥ 0.357).
Hence, when M is very small, the developer is so efficient that the planner chooses not to regulate
the SM, which chooses it limit size (N o = N¯). The disappearance of the SST is compensated by
the very large number of stores hosted by the SM. In contrast, when M = 3, the SM is much less
efficient. This leads the regulator to intervene and to choose the size N o = 0.5, and thus the SST
has a size n∗(N o) ≈ 1.57. In sum, a very efficient developer must not be regulated. Otherwise, the
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regulator increases social welfare by choosing a size for the SM smaller than its equilibrium size.
However, in both cases, a majority of consumers remains hostile to the SM’s entry. This provides
a neat illustration of the possible discrepancy between the efficient and voting outcomes.
In France, the Royer Law imposes restrictions on department stores whose creation has to
be approved by a local board composed of shop-owners, consumer representatives, and locally
elected politicians. Between 1974 and 1998, the local boards approved only about 40 percent of
the applications. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) have showed that the enforcement of this law has
had a negative impact on job creation. In other words, the entry of a new SM, which may be
desirable in terms of job creation, is opposed by a majority of board members. This seems to be
in accordance with the above results.
6 Heterogeneous Marketplaces and the City
In this section, we discuss the following extensions of the baseline model: (i) the presence of cost
and quality asymmetries between retailers and stores; (ii) a change in market/city size; (iii) a
non-uniform distribution of consumers across the city; (iv) the choice of the SM location by the
developer.
6.1 Heterogeneous shopping places
We have argued in Section 2 that various types of asymmetries between the two shopping places
may be taken into account in our setting. To illustrate, we consider the following special, but
relevant, case: retailers are less efficient than stores but supply better quality varieties. In other
words, the retailers share the marginal cost c, whereas stores have the marginal cost C = λc,
where λ < 1. The parameter λ captures the efficiency heterogeneity between stores and retailers,
which may stem from additional facilities supplied by the developer to his tenants. In the same
vein, being designed, developed and managed as a single unit, a supermarket benefits from scope
economies and is often able to buy inputs in bulk at prices lower than retailers.
Consumers’ preferences are rewritten as follows:
U ≡ 1
ρ
ln
(
I(SST )α
 n
0
qρi di+ I(SM)
 N
0
Qρjdj
)
+ A
where the parameter α captures the quality heterogeneity between the two types of varieties. In
what follows, we focus on the case where α > 1.
Under these circumstances, the prices charged by the retailers and stores are, respectively, given
by
p∗ = c
ρ
P ∗ = λc
ρ
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and thus the price ratio is equal to λ < 1. Retailers’ and stores’ profit functions are now given by
piR(n,N) = (1− ρ)
(
x¯0
n
+ x¯1 − x¯0
n+ kN
)
(32)
piS(n,N) = k(1− ρ)
(1− x¯1
kN
+ x¯1 − x¯0
n+ kN
)
(33)
where k ≡ λ−(σ−1)α−σ. Note that k is larger (smaller) than 1 when only efficiency (quality)
heterogeneity matters. When both kinds of heterogeneity are present, k can be either smaller or
larger than 1, depending on which of the two types of heterogeneity dominates. When k > 1,
everything work as if the number of stores were larger and given by kN instead of N . This in
turn makes the SM more attractive, and thus expenditure in the SM also gets higher and equal to
k > 1. When k < 1, the argument is reversed. Thus, the two types of heterogeneity between the
centers are formally equivalent.
It is easily verified that the marginal consumers are now given by
x¯0 = max
{
0, 1− ln (1 + kN/n)lnT
}
(34)
x¯1 = min
{
1, ln (1 + n/kN)lnT
}
(35)
where N is again replaced with kN .
The expressions (32)-(35) show that the profit functions piR(n,N) and piS(n,N) are the same
as those obtained when k = 1 up to replacing N with kN and multiplying piS by k. Therefore,
the results that hold under k > 1 are qualitatively the same as those obtained in the foregoing
two sections. The main difference is that “effective” number of stores, kN , exceeds the “actual”
number, N . In particular, selling at a lower price translates into a smaller limit size for the SM,
which is less costly for the developer to implement.
Other heterogeneities such as a higher degree of product differentiation in the SST than in the
SM, which supplies more standardized goods, and the presence of urban amenities available at the
city center, can similarly be taken into account as long as the price ratio remains constant.
6.2 City size
Owing to the presence of network effects, it is worth studying how an exogenous shock on the
city’s population size L affects the market outcome. Consumers’ preferences are still given by (1),
while retailers’ and stores’ operating profits are given by Lpil(n, N) with l ∈ {R, S}, the functions
pil being given by (15) – (16).
We may tackle this problem from two different angles. In the first one, we study the impact of
a growing city on the size n∗(N ;L) of the SST when N is given and determined through different
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institutional mechanisms. Therefore, the analysis of Section 4.1 is applicable.
Free entry in the SST and homogeneity of piR implies
piR
(
n
L
,
N
L
)
= f (36)
which yields
n∗(N ; L) = Ln∗
(
N
L
; 1
)
. (37)
Furthermore, n∗(N ; 1) being decreasing in N , raising L amounts to decreasing N . It then
follows from (37) that, when the SM has a given size N , a population hike triggers the entry of a
more than proportionate number of downtown retailers. The intuition for this a priori unexpected
result is as follows. When there is no SM, the size of the SST is proportional to the population
size: ne(L) = L(1 − ρ)/f . Since N/L decreases with L, things work as if N were decreasing in
Section 4.1. Thus, for any given n, profits of downtown retailers are shifted upward, which invites
additional entry.
In the second one, we study the impact of a growing city on the developers’ limit size. It follows
from (36) that
pi(µ) = Nf
L
. (38)
Since pi(µ) is independent of L, the limit size N¯(L) of the SM is given by
N¯(L) = L
f
pi(µ¯)
which means that the limit size of the SM is proportional to the city’s population size: N¯(L) =
L N¯(1). In other words, in a bigger city it is harder for the developer to secure the whole market.
These results together support the idea that a larger city is more likely to retain downtown
retailers than a smaller (or poorer) city. To some extent, this explains why large and rich cities, such
as New York, San Francisco, Paris or Milan, have maintained a vibrant downtown, Los Angeles
being a prominent counter-example. The hollowing-out of urban centers characterizes mainly
small and medium size cities, especially those which do not have historical amenities generated by
monuments, buildings, parks, and other urban infrastructure from past eras that are aesthetically
pleasing to people.
6.3 Population density
In monocentric cities, population is concentrated around the central business district (Fujita and
Thisse, 2013). Let g(x) and G(x) be, respectively, the population density and cumulative distri-
bution functions. Observe, first, that the marginal consumers x¯0 and x¯1 given by (13) and (14)
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are independent of G. Hence, the fraction of people who choose one-stop shopping at the SST
(SM) equals G(x¯0) (1 − G(x¯1)), whereas G(x¯1) − G(x¯0) is the share of consumers who shop in
both marketplaces. Further, the equilibrium price of each variety and the quantities bought by
consumers are also independent of G. Hence, retailers’ operating profits are given by
piR(n, N) = (1− ρ)
[
G(x¯0)
n
+ G(x¯1)−G(x¯0)
n+N
]
. (39)
The analysis of Sections 3 and 4 still holds for a large class of distributions G(x). Basically, for
most of our analysis, what we need are the following two conditions: piR(0, N) = piR(∞, N) = 0
for N > 0. To show how this works, consider a negative exponential population density, which is
known to provide a good approximation of city population densities (Anas et al., 1998):
g(x) ≡ αe
−αx
1− e−α G(x) =
1− e−αx
1− e−α (40)
where α > 0 measures the population skewness towards the SST. When α = 0, the density is
uniform.
Simulations show that (i) for each T there exists a finite positive threshold value α¯(T ), such that
piR is unimodal in n if and only if α ≤ α¯(T ), (ii) piS is unimodal in N ; and (iii) when α ≤ α¯(T ), the
developer’s revenue increases in N . This has the following implications. First, when the population
is not too much concentrated toward the SST, N¯ exists such that for each N ∈]0, N¯ [ there is a
unique plausible free-entry equilibrium; otherwise, several plausible equilibria may exist. Second,
if α is not too large, neither the market expansion effect nor the market crowding effect always
dominates the other. Third, under the same condition on α, the market outcome is described by
a perfect Nash equilibrium whose structure is similar to that studied in Section 4. Thus, when the
skewness of the population distribution is not too high, the key results obtained in Sections 3 and
4 remain qualitatively the same.
6.4 The location of the shopping mall
It remains to discuss what our analysis becomes when the SM is built at xSM ∈ [0, 1[. For the
reasons mentioned in Section 5.1, the SST is located at x = 0.
To see how consumers’ shopping behavior is affected by a change in the SM location, we go
back to the indirect utilities given in Section 2.2. It is straightforward to show that (7), (9) and
(11) become
V0(x, xSM) = (1− ρ) lnn− τx
V1(x, xSM) = (1− ρ) lnN − τ |x− xSM |
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V (x, xSM) = (1− ρ) ln (n+N)− τ max{x, xSM}.
The key difference with the case where xSM = 1 is that the welfare of consumers patronizing
both shopping places now depends on their locations (see Figure 4 for an illustration). To be
precise, V decreases with the distance x to the SM for those consumers who are located to the
right of xSM . Moreover, V strictly increases when the SM gets closer to the SST. In other words,
the closer SM to the SST, the larger the number of two-stop shoppers.
Figure 4. Shopping behavior under variable location of SM
It is readily verified that
xSM ≥ ln(1 + 1/ν)lnT
implies the existence of two marginal consumers located xˆ0 and xˆ1, which solve, respectively, the
equations V0 = V and V1 = V :
xˆ0 = max
{
0, xSM − ln(1 + ν)lnT
}
xˆ1 = min
{
1, ln (1 + 1/ν)lnT
}
which are identical to (13) and (14) when xSM = 1.
As in Section 2.2, a consumer located at x visits the SST only (both shopping places, or the
SM only) if and only if x < xˆ0 (xˆ0 ≤ x ≤ xˆ1, or x > xˆ1). Note that xˆ1 is independent of the SM
location, while xˆ0 moves together with xSM . Thus, if
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xSM ≤ ln(1 + ν)lnT (41)
then xˆ0 = 0, which implies that no consumer chooses to visit only the SST. Furthermore, if
xSM <
ln(1 + 1/ν)
lnT (42)
then all consumers located to the right of xˆ0 are two-stop shoppers. As a consequence, there is a
downward jump in the stores’ revenue at xSM = xˆ1.
In sum, if
xSM ≤ min
{
ln(1 + ν)
lnT ,
ln(1 + 1/ν)
lnT
}
then all consumers are two-stop shoppers. Thus, choosing a location closer to the SST leaves
stores’ revenues, hence the developer’s revenue, unchanged. Since the developer’s building cost
function B
(
xSM , N
D
)
is likely to decrease with xSM because the land rent at a location closer
to the city center is much higher (Fujita and Thisse, 2013), choosing a location in the vicinity of
the SST reduces the developer’s profits. Thus, the developer is incentivized to choose a location
for the SM distant from the SST. How far are the two shopping places depends on the parameters
of the market. To a certain extent, our analysis highlights why shopping malls or supermarkets
have chosen to set up at the city outskirts once travel costs became sufficiently low through the
widespread use of cars (Fogelson, 2005).
7 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a model of competition between two spatially separated shopping areas having
different organizational forms and showed how the interaction of love for variety and travel costs
affects consumers’ shopping behavior. The standard competition effect is supplemented by a
market expansion effect, which stems from the higher attractiveness of a shopping area offering
a wider range of products. Our results have been obtained for the case in which 2 < T < 4.
What do they become when this condition is not satisfied? Simulations suggest that they remain
qualitatively the same for a broader domain of parameter values. However, there is another domain
in which multiple interior stable free-entry equilibria arise for both T < 2 and T > 4. The reason is
that the function pi(µ) may become bimodal, which implies that n∗(N) exhibits two discontinuities.
Using the same argument as in Section 4.2, we may conclude that the expected outcome is given
the largest stable free-entry equilibrium, the size of which is smaller than ne. Thus, dealing with
the domains T < 2 and T > 4 requires longer developments, but does not affect the nature of
our results. Moreover, whether consumers are one-stop or two-stop shoppers still depends on the
relative size of the two shopping places.
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Relaxing the assumption of CES preferences implies that consumers’ expenditures on the dif-
ferentiated good and sellers’ markups are variable and determined by the number of varieties
available in the two marketplaces. Typically, consumers expenditures in a shopping area increases
with the number of varieties supplied therein, while sellers’ markups decrease with the number
of local competitors. As a consequence, the analysis of the competition and market expansion
effects becomes much more involved. Nevertheless, the specific functional forms of piR and piS are
not needed for the main findings of Sections 3 and 4 to hold. We need only these functions to
display a few regularities we now summarize. First, piR must be unimodal in n to get the pattern
of free-entry equilibria described in Proposition 2. Second, piR must be unimodal in n and piS in
N for the market expansion effect to overcome (be dominated by) the competition effect when
the shopping area is small (large). Last, the behavior of the developer described in subsection 4.3
hinges on the fact that the developer’s revenue increases in the SM size.
Our paper generalizes the law of retail gravitation proposed by Reilly (1931), which has been
extensively studied in spatial interaction theory. According to this law, two cities attract consumers
living in an intermediate place in direct proportion of the populations of the two cities and in inverse
proportion to the square of the distances to these two cities. We show that consumers close to one
city need not visit both of them, while those located in intermediate places split their expenditures
between the two cities according to a rule more general than Reilly’s. In the same vein, our model
is closely related to the gravity equation used in trade theory (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004),
by providing microspatial foundations to this equation.
Finally, in the wake of Hotelling (1929), we can reinterpret our model to describe a population
of consumers heterogeneous in their attitude toward the organizational form used to supply a
differentiated good - think of bakeries, breweries, or bookstores. In the first one, the good is
produced and sold by a large firm; in the second, it is provided by many small firms. Though
consumers like variety, they may also have a strong preference for one organizational form over the
other. Our results then show how the two organizational forms interact to shape the structure of
the industry.
References
[1] Anas, A., R. Arnott, and K.A. Small (1998) Urban spatial structure. Journal of Economic
Literature 36: 1426-64.
[2] Anderson, J., and van Wincoop, E. (2004) Trade costs. Journal of Economic Literature 42:
691-751.
[3] Armstrong, M. and J. Vickers (2010) Competitive non-linear pricing and bundling. Review of
Economic Studies 77: 30-60.
30
[4] Bertrand, M. and F. Kramarz (2002) Does entry regulation hinder job creation? Evidence
from the French retail industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 1369-413.
[5] Chemla, G. (2003) Downstream competition, foreclosure, and vertical integration. Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy 12: 261-89.
[6] Chen, Y. and M.H. Riordan (2008) Price-increasing competition. RAND Journal of Economics
39: 1042-58.
[7] Chou, C.F. and O. Shy (1990) Network effects without network externalities. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 8: 259-70.
[8] Cohen, L. (1996) From town center to shopping center: The reconfiguration of community
marketplaces in Postwar America. American Historical Review 101: 1050-8.
[9] Courser, Z. (2005) Wal-Mart and the Politics of American Retail. Washington, DC: Compet-
itive Enterprise Institute.
[10] Couture, V., G. Duranton and M. Turner (2012) Speed. University of Pennsylvania, Wharton
School.
[11] Dixit, A.K. and J.E. Stiglitz (1977) Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity.
American Economic Review 67: 297-308.
[12] Fogelson, R.M. (2005) Downtown. Its rise and fall, 1880-1950. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
[13] Fujita, M. and J.-F. Thisse (2013) Economics of Agglomeration. Cities, Industrial Location
and Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[14] Gehrig, T. (1998) Competing exchanges. European Economic Review 42: 277-310.
[15] Hotelling, H. (1929) Stability in competition. Economic Journal 39: 41-57.
[16] McMillan, J., and M. Rothschild (1994) Search. In: R.J. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.). Handbook
of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Volume 2. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 905-27.
[17] Reilly, W.J. (1931) The Law of Retail Gravitation. New York: Pilsbury.
[18] Schulz, N. and K. Stahl (1996) Do consumers search for the highest price? Equilibrium and
monopolistic optimum in differentiated products markets. RAND Journal of Economics 27:
542-62.
[19] Shimomura, K.-I. and J.-F. Thisse (2012) Competition among the big and the small. RAND
Journal of Economics 43: 329-47.
31
[20] Smith, H. and D. Hay (2005) Streets, malls, and supermarkets. Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy 14: 29-59.
[21] Stahl, K. (1982) Location and spatial pricing theory with nonconvex transportation cost
schedules. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 575-82.
[22] Stahl, K. (1987) Theories of urban business location. In: E.S. Mills (ed.). Handbook of Regional
and Urban Economics, Volume 2. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 759-820.
[23] Teller, C . (2008) Shopping streets versus shopping malls – Determinants of agglomeration
format attractiveness from the consumers ’ point of view. International Review of Retail,
Distribution and Consumer Research 18: 381-403.
[24] Wolinsky, A. (1983) Retail trade concentration due to consumers’ imperfect information. Bell
Journal of Economics 14: 275-82.
Appendix
Appendix 1.
(i) Assume that T ≤ 2.39. Using (19), it is readily verified that dDS/dν > 0 for all ν ∈
]1/(T − 1), T − 1[ if and only if
θ(ν) > lnT
where
θ(ν) ≡ ln
(
1 + 1
ν
)
+ ν
2(1− ln (1 + ν)) + 1
1 + 2ν .
The function θ decreases with ν, whereas θ
(
1
T−1
)
> lnT for all 2 < T < 4. Therefore,
dDS/dν > 0 for 0 < x¯0 < x¯0 < 1 if and only if
θ(T − 1) ≥ lnT (A.1)
or, equivalently,
A(T ) ≡ 1 + (T − 1)2(1− lnT )− (2T − 1) ln (T − 1) ≥ 0. (A.2)
The function A decreases with T on ]2, 4[. Since A(2) > 0 and A(4) < 0, the equation A(T ) = 0
has a unique solution in ]2, 4[. Solving numerically this equation shows T = 2.39 so that that (A.2)
holds if and only if T ≤ 2.39.
(ii) Assume now that T > 2.39. Then, there exists a threshold ν¯ ∈ ]1/(T − 1), T − 1[ such that
dD/dν > 0 if and only if ν < ν¯. Indeed, we have just seen that (A.1) does not hold if and only if
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T > 2.39. In this case, the equation θ(ν) = lnT has a unique solution ν¯ ∈ ]1/(T − 1), T − 1[ and
(A.2) does not hold if and only if ν exceeds ν¯. Q.E.D.
(iii) When T > 2.06, the competition effects becomes stronger than the market expansion effect
for all ν > T − 1. Indeed, differentiating (20) with respect to ν yields:
n
dDS
dν
= −1− x¯1
ν2
− x¯1(1 + ν)2 −
1
ν
dx¯1
dν
1
1 + ν .
This expression is negative if and only if
λ(ν) < lnT (A.3)
where
λ(ν) ≡ (1 + 2ν) ln
(
1 + 1
ν
)
+ 1
(1 + ν)2 .
The function λ decreases with ν for all ν > 1 because the denominator is increasing, whereas
the numerator is positive and decreasing. As a result, (A.3) holds for all ν ≥ T − 1 if and only if
λ(T − 1) < lnT
or, equivalently,
H(T ) ≡ (T − 1)2 lnT + (2T − 1) ln(T − 1)− 1 > 0.
The function H(T ) is increasing in T , negative at T = 2 and positive at T = 4. Therefore,
H(T ) = 0 has a single solution in ]2, 4[. We find numerically that this solution is given by
T0 = 2.06. Hence (A.3) holds for all ν > T − 1 if and only if T > 2.06.
(iv) Assume that T ≤ 2.06. Then, there exists νˆ > T −1 such that the market expansion effect
dominates the competition effect if and only if ν < νˆ. Indeed, we have just seen that (A.3) does
not hold for all ν > T − 1 under T ≤ 2.06. As λ(ν) is a decreasing function and λ(∞) = 0, there
exists νˆ > T − 1 such that (A.3) holds only for ν < νˆ. Q.E.D.
Appendix 2.
(i) n < N/(T − 1). Then,
x¯0 = 0 x¯1 =
ln (1 + n/N)
lnT .
Hence, using (15), retailers’ operating profit boils down to
piR =
1− ρ
lnT
ln (1 + n/N)
n+N
which increases when τ decreases.
(ii) N/(T − 1) ≤ n ≤ N . In this case,
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x¯0 = 1− ln (1 +N/n)lnT x¯1 =
ln (1 + n/N)
lnT .
Hence,
piR = (1− ρ)
[
1
n
− 1
n+N +
1
lnT
(1−N/n) ln (1 +N/n)− ln(N/n)
n+N
]
.
When n < N , we have
(
1− N
n
)
ln
(
1 + N
n
)
− ln N
n
< 0
and thus piR decreases when τ decreases. Q.E.D.
Appendix 3. Since pi(µ) is increasing over the interval ]0, 1/(T − 1)[, there is no stable free-
entry equilibrium such that µ < 1/(T − 1). Consider now the interval ]1/(T − 1), T − 1[ and show
that N(µ) is increasing. Up to a positive coefficient independent of µ, we have
N(µ) = lnT + (µ− 1) ln(1 + µ) + lnµ
µ
.
Differentiating this expression yields
N′(µ) = Λ(µ)
µ2
where
Λ(µ) ≡ µ
2 + 1
µ+ 1 − lnT + ln(1 + µ)− lnµ.
To show that Λ(µ) is positive over ]1/(T − 1), T − 1[, we differentiate Λ(µ) and get
Λ′(µ) ≡ (µ− 1)(µ
2 + 3µ+ 1)
µ(µ+ 1)2
so that µ = 1 is a minimizer of Λ(µ). Hence, Λ(µ) > 0 if Λ(1) > 0. Since T < 4, we have
Λ(1) = 1 + ln 2− lnT > 1− ln 2 > 0.
Last, we examine the behavior of N(µ) for µ ≥ T − 1. Up to a positive coefficient independent
of µ, we have
N(µ) = (1 + µ) lnT − ln(1 + µ) + lnµ
µ
.
Differentiating this expression, we obtain
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N′(µ) = K(µ)
µ2
.
where
K(µ) ≡ 11 + µ − lnT + ln(1 + 1/µ).
Clearly, K(µ) decreases with µ. Furthermore, K(µ), whence N′(µ), is negative under suffi-
ciently large values of µ. As a result, N(µ) is unimodal and has a unique maximizer µ0 ≥ T − 1.
Q.E.D.
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